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Recent Cases
Lande's violations were in fact included within the plain meaning of
§§ 2511 and 2512 and therefore affirmed the lower court in this respect.
The appellate court first considered
the applicability of § 2511 of the Wiretap Law. This section prohibits the
intentional interception and disclosure
of wire, oral and electronic communications "except as... specifically provided." Among the specific exceptions
provided by the statute were the unauthorized viewing of cable television
and the viewing of certain unscrambled
satellite programming. The court, however, found no specific exception for
the unauthorized interception of
scrambled satellite signals. Therefore,
it concluded that the plain meaning of
§ 2511 applied to Lande's interception
of scrambled satellite signals.
Next, the court considered § 2512
of the Wiretap Law. This section
regulates those devices whose design
makes them "primarily useful for...
the surreptitious interception of wire,
oral or electronic communications."
Focusing on the design, the court reasoned that by modifying the
descramblers to unscramble all satellite
programming, Lande had rendered
them of use to unauthorized viewers.
Furthermore, the court found that
Lande's interception of satellite programming was surreptitious because
the producers of the programming had
no way of knowing that their signals
were being intercepted. Therefore, the
court reasoned that the plain meaning
of § 2512 applied to Lande's violations.
What Did CongressMean?
Having concluded that the plain language of the Wiretap Law applies to
satellite interceptions, the court then
considered Lande's argument that Congress did not actually intend the law to
apply in this manner.
First, Lande argued that the legislative history of the law showed an intent
to exclude from its purview "satellite
cable programming," as defined in the
Communications Act at 47 U.S.C. §
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605, which regulates the unauthorized
publication and use of communications. In the Communications Act, the
term "satellite cable programming" is
expressly defined as "video programming ...

transmitted via satellite

and... primarily intended for the direct receipt by cable operators for their
retransmission to cable subscribers."
The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded
that the drafters of the Wiretap Law
were not referring to the Communications Act definition. Instead, the court
stated that the most natural interpretation of the legislators' statements was
that they indicate an intention to exclude from the Wiretap Law not all
satellite programming, but only unscrambled satellite programming.
Lande was charged with pirating
scrambled satellite programs.
Next, Lande argued that the Communications Act already criminalized
satellite television piracy, and that it
was unlikely that Congress intended to
override that law with § 2511 or to
have the two overlap. The court also
rejected this argument, finding that
Congress intended to avoid overlap
with some, though not all, existing
statutes. The court pointed out that the
Wiretap Law treats different statutes
differently and also cited evidence of
legislative history that the two laws
were in fact intended to overlap.
Third, Lande argued that even if the
statutes did overlap, it would be contrary to Congressional intent to allow
prosecution under either of the two
because the penalties differed significantly. Under the Communications
Act, a simple conviction carried a sentence of up to six months; under § 2511,
a violation could bring a term of up to
five years. The appellate court rejected
this argument, finding that when the
same conduct could be prosecuted under either of two statutes, prosecutors
have the discretion to decide which to
pursue.
Finally, the court turned to the absence of specific discussions of satellite
piracy in the legislative history of the
Wiretap Law. The court focused upon

I

United States v. Herring,933 F.2d 932
(11 th Cir. 1991), a decision that gave
considerable weight to the absence of
specific discussions. In Herring, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that by omitting mention of such a significant technology from a debate that included
consideration of a range of other specific technologies, Congress indicated
that the Wiretap Law did not to apply
to satellite television. The Ninth Circuit, however, found this argument
unpersuasive because, although Congress provided specific exemptions that
even covered some unscrambled satellite television transmissions, it made no
specific exemption for scrambled signals. The appellate court further stated
that this could not have been an oversight because Congress was well aware
of such technology and had in fact held
hearings on signal scrambling in response to complaints from satellite dish
owners.
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Restrictions on the
Transferability of Frequent
FlyerAwards Enforced
In American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992),
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit enforced frequent
flyer "no-sale" rules that prohibited the
resale of frequent flyer awards. The
court found that a business which
brokered frequent flyer program awards
interfered with contractual relations
and engaged in unfair competition.
Additionally, the court held that the
airline whose travel awards are brokered
suffers real damages for which each
individual member of the brokering
corporation was liable.
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Tickets, Anyone?
American Airlines ("American")
offered frequent flyers the opportunity
to earn travel awards by patronizing
American and American affiliates under its "AAdvantage" program. The
program paid customers in miles, which
the customers then redeemed for various awards such as free travel, first
class upgrades, hotel discounts, and
rental car discounts. When exchanging
these miles for awards, program members promised not to sell or exchange
the award for cash or any other kind of
consideration. However, American
allowed program members to give
awards as gifts.
Randall Christensen and five others
("the Brokers") operated the Coupon
Connection, a Utah travel agency specializing in brokering frequent flyer
coupons. The Brokers purchased travel
awards from AAdvantage program
members and sold them at discount
prices. In order to avoid the no-sale
provision, the Brokers altered airline
tickets and provided buyers with bogus
identification cards in the names of the
award sellers. In addition, the Brokers
encouraged buyers to misrepresent the
purchased awards as gifts, and furnished "cheat sheets" that familiarized
buyers with the alleged gift giver to
help buyers authenticate their stories
when dealing with American agents.
Furthermore, the Brokers improperly
accumulated mileage by paying people
to fly under the assumed names of
program members who were entitled to
AAdvantage accounts.
American brought an action against
the operators of the Coupon Connection in a federal district court of Utah
claiming tortious interference with contract rights and unfair competition.
The district court found the Brokers
liable and permanently enjoined them
from buying, selling, or brokering
travel awards. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision and relegated the determination of damages to
subsequent proceedings.

No-Sale Restrictions Are
Enforceable
The Brokers first argued that the nosale clause was unenforceable because
it violated the public policy against
restraint of trade. In support of their
position, the Brokers assembled a list
of statutory and other legal authority
supporting this position. The court
found, however, that none of the statutes provided a legal basis for an action
arising out of American's no-sale rule.
The court noted Utah's custom of narrowly interpreting public policy and
reasoned that the absence of any statute
dealing with a no-sale rule, indicated a
prevailing public policy to favor the
kind of restrictions on transferability
of contract rights embodied by the nosale clause.
Additionally, the court found that
the transferability restrictions lawfully
accompanied the tickets sold by American. The court reasoned that since
American owned the right to sell nontransferable tickets to original purchasers, it logically enjoyed the connected
right to limit the transferability of tickets issued through its award program.
Furthermore, persons acquiring the
tickets through brokers' surreptitious
practices were subject to the same nontransferability. Accordingly, the court
held the no-sale provision enforceable
as a matter of law.
Tortious Interference by Brokers
The court unequivocally found that
the no-sale provision was an enforceable term in a contract between American and the program member who exchanged their mileage for a travel
award. The court noted that when
members presented American with the
appropriate number of miles and promised to honor the no-sale clause, they
accepted American's offer of free travel
and formed a contract.
The Brokers argued, however, that
no contract was formed until the member actually accepted the award. According to this position, the Brokers'
solicitation of sellers before actual re-

ceipt of the award from American constituted interference with prospective
economic relations, not with an existing contract between American and the
frequent flyer customer. Furthermore,
the Brokers stated that American must
prove that the Brokers acted "for an
improper purpose or by improper
means." The court, however, declined
to pinpoint the moment of contract
formation and found that the Brokers'
"undisputed deceit and misrepresentation" satisfied this higher standard of
proof. Therefore, the court held that
the Brokers' actions clearly constituted
tortious interference.

Airline Proves Damages by
Misappropriation Theory
The Brokers next argued that American had failed to show damages resulting from the alleged interference.
American conceded the need to prove
some economic harm in order to prevail since damages were an essential
element of both the interference and
unfair competition claims. Consequently, the airline advanced three damage theories: misappropriation of services; unjust enrichment; and nominal
damages.
The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that American
suffered damages when the Brokers
misappropriated American's services.
The court found that since the no-sale
provision rendered the brokered tickets
invalid, buyers travelling on those tickets were "stowaways" who cheated
American out of its regular fare and
occupied seats that would otherwise
have been filled by paying customers.
Furthermore, the court stated that even
though the seats may have remained
empty or the stowaways would not
have flown had they been required to
pay the full fare did not diminish
American's damages. The court did
not rule on the other theories of damages because the misappropriation
theory fulfilled the requirement of damages essential to the claims.
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Corporate Officers Liable for
Damages
Finally, the Brokers argued that the
district court erred in granting judgment against the individual corporate
officers. The appellate court rejected
this argument. Instead, the court used
the well settled principle that corporate
officers who actively participate in a
tortious act are personally liable for
resulting injuries to affirm the district
court's decision. The court stated that
since the Brokers had established their
businesses specifically to interfere with
contractual relations and to misappropriate airline services, and that because
each defendant had actively participated in the business' activities, the
individual defendants were personally
responsible. The court of appeals also
affirmed the district court's decision to
enforce the no-sale rules, finding the
Brokers liable for contract interference, and upheld the permanent injunction prohibiting the Brokers from
dealing in AAdvantage awards. +-

Michael J. Lubeck

Public Policy Prohibits

Parent from Signing Away
Child's Negligence Claim
In Scott v. Pacific Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992), the
Supreme Court of Washington held
that, as a matter of public policy, a
parent could not waive its child's future claims against a negligent third
party. The court further held that a
plaintiff's assumption of the risks inherent in participation in a sports activity did not bar the plaintiff's claims
against an operator who failed to maintain reasonably safe conditions. Instead, the skier who assumed the risks
innate in the sport could be
contributorily negligent, and thus receive a lower damage award.
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Ski School Argued Parent Released
Child's Claim
Twelve-year-old Justin Scott ("Justin") was a student in the Grayson
Connor Ski School ("Ski School"),
which conducted lessons at a commercial Ski Resort owned by Pacific West
Mountain Resort ("Ski Resort").
Justin's mother completed and signed
his Ski School application, which included personal information as well as
an agreement to refrain from holding
the Ski School liable for any injuries
sustained during Justin's lessons. While
practicing on a race course designed
and arranged by the Ski School, Justin
lost control and veered away from the
course into an abandoned tow-rope
shack. Justin collided with one of the
shack's exposed support poles and sustained serious head injuries as a result
of the accident.
Justin and his parents sued the Ski
Resort and Ski School, alleging that
the course was carelessly planned and
positioned too close to the hazardous
tow-rope shack. Not disputing the
facts, the Ski School and the Ski Resort
both moved for judgments as a matter
of law. The Ski School claimed that
the exculpatory clause in the Ski School
application released the school from
responsibility for its negligence. The
Ski Resort asserted that Justin could not
recover because he had assumed the
risks inherent in the sport when he
skied the course. The trial court granted
both motions and dismissed the Scotts'
claims. The Washington Supreme
Court then granted Justin's petitions
for direct review.
Parents Could Not Sign Away
Child's Claims
Reviewing the language of the exculpatory clause signed by Justin's
mother, the Washington Supreme Court
found that the language of the clause
was clear and therefore satisfactorily
showed the parties' intent to shift the
risk of loss away from the Ski School.
The court held that the language of the
release need not include the word negligence to be effective.

After finding the language of the
clause effective, the court considered
the validity of Mrs. Scott's release
under the general Washington state
rule that a clear exculpatory clause is
enforceable unless it violates public
policy. The court discussed whether a
parent-signed exculpatory clause precluding a child's prospective cause of
action violated public policy. In analyzing the issue, the court focused on
cases from Washington and otherjurisdictions which held that parents could
not legally discharge a child's claim
after an injury without a court's permission. The court reasoned that allowing parents to release their child's
claims before injury would be illogical
and contrary to those earlier cases.
Therefore, although Mrs. Scott's signature on the contract prevented her
and her husband from suing the Ski
School, her signature did not preclude
Justin's claim.
Ski Resort Liable for Dangerous
Conditions
Since Justin himself had never signed
a contract which expressly prevented
him from bringing suit, the court examined whether he impliedly assumed
the risk of injury inherent in the sport
of skiing. The court maintained that
the doctrine of implied primary assumption of the risk prohibits any recovery where the injury sustained ensues from known and appreciated risks
that are common to the sport.
The court distinguished these assumed risks from those which are caused
by a third party. To determine the
extent of fault attributable to Justin and
to the Ski Resort, the court examined
Washington case law and the state's ski
statute. The court referred to Kirk v.
WSU, 746 P.2d 287 (Wash. 1987), in
which the Washington Supreme Court
distinguished between those risks inherent to the sport of cheerleading, and
those risks caused by the negligent
provision of practice facilities or improper supervision. The court in Kirk
stressed that to the extent a cheerleader
knowingly continued to practice under
29

